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Abstract
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and
sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral
hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever
the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the
costs of free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. The model predicts a greater use
of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects,
firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and ineﬃ-
cient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent
with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndi-
cation.
JEL classification: D82; G21; G32
Keywords: individual-bank lending, multiple-bank lending, monitoring, diver-
sification, free-riding problem
Recent empirical findings (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2000a; Ongena and Smith,
2000b) suggest a widespread use of multiple-bank lending. In almost all countries even
relatively small firms borrow from several banks at the same time. The distribution
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of the number of bank relationships per firm varies substantially across countries, but
single-bank lending tends to be quite rare and multiple-bank lending often consists
of many banks.1
Explaining the great use of multiple-bank lending requires an understanding of
what advantages it can provide to both firms and banks. This widespread phe-
nomenon seems somewhat puzzling and contrasts with the “classical” theory of banks
as delegated monitors originating from Diamond (1984). This theory argues that ex-
clusive bank-firm relationships are optimal as they avoid duplication of screening
and monitoring eﬀorts as well as free-riding.2 Recent contributions have put forth
some potential explanations of firms’ choice of multiple-bank lending. These include
firms’ desire to mitigate hold-up and overmonitoring problems as well as the liquid-
ity risk aﬀecting exclusive bank-firm relationships (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Von
Thadden, 1992; Carletti, 2004; and Detragiache et al., 2000). Concerning banks’
choice, multiple-bank lending enables banks to commit not to extend further ineﬃ-
cient credit, thus solving the soft-budget-constraint problem of single-bank lending
and reducing firms’ strategic defaults (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996). Also, the mitigation of the hold-up problem improves firms’ in-
centives to make proper investment choices, thus increasing banks’ profits (Padilla
and Pagano, 1997).
The above mentioned explanations do not provide an answer, however, to the
apparent contradiction between the great use of multiple-bank lending and the pre-
dictions of the theory of banks as delegated monitors. If monitoring is one of the
main functions −if not the main function− that banks exert, especially in small and
medium business lending, why should they decide to share firms’ financing if this
reduces their monitoring function? Does the great use of multiple-bank lending sug-
gest that the role of banks as delegated monitors is of minor importance? Or does
multiple-bank lending entail some −previously unnoticed− benefits for banks’ incen-
tives to monitor? These questions are critical especially in lending where monitoring
is important, banks retain some bargaining power and can decide the preferred lend-
ing structure. They are also timely as the ongoing process of deregulation expands
loan markets, and it confronts banks with the issues of how to enter into new markets
1Ongena and Smith (2000b) find that 20% of the firms in their sample of 1079 firms from 20
European countries use eight or more banks. Detragiache et al. (2000) report that 89 percent of
Italian small firms borrow from multiple banks with the median number of relationships being five.
They report also a median number of two relationships for US small firms.
2See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review of the modern theory of financial intermediation and
Boot (2000) for a more specific review of the literature on relationship banking.
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and monitor new clients.
This paper argues that, when one considers explicitly banks’ incentives to monitor,
multiple-bank lending may become an optimal way for banks with limited lending
capacities to commit to higher monitoring levels. Despite involving free-riding and
duplication of eﬀorts, sharing lending allows banks to expand the number of loans
and achieve greater diversification. This mitigates the agency problem between banks
and depositors and reduces the cost of funding. Thus, diﬀerently from the classical
theory of banks as delegated monitors, the paper suggests that multiple-bank lending
may positively aﬀect overall monitoring and increase firms’ profitability. The result
provides a possible theoretical rationale for the finding in Houston and James (1996)
that firms borrowing from multiple banks (but not from other multiple creditors)
have greater growth opportunities.
Building on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we address these issues in a one-period
model which endogenizes banks’ incentives to monitor. There are three types of
agents: Firms, banks and investors. Firms need external funds to undertake invest-
ment projects and can privately decide whether to exert eﬀort and increase project
success probabilities. Banks can ameliorate this moral hazard problem through mon-
itoring, which is however costly and not observable. This unobservability introduces
another moral hazard problem between banks and depositors. Banks’ incentives to
monitor depend on whether they lend to firms individually or share lending with
other banks. Multiple-bank lending improves banks’ monitoring incentives by allow-
ing banks to finance more projects and reach greater diversification; but it entails also
free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. Banks choose to share lending whenever the
benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher per-project monitoring dominates
the costs of free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts. The attractiveness of multiple-bank
lending decreases with the amount of inside equity and project profitability, and it
increases with the cost of monitoring. Thus, the model predicts a greater use of
multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to the projects they finance,
when firms are less profitable, and when poor financial integration, strict regulation
and ineﬃcient judicial systems make monitoring more costly. These predictions find
empirical support in Ongena and Smith (2000b) and in Detragiache et al. (2000).
The key aspects of the analysis are banks’ moral hazard problem and limited lend-
ing capacities. The incentive mechanism of diversification works only if banks raise
deposits. If banks are non-leveraged, greater diversification decreases the variance of
the average portfolio return, but it has no eﬀects on banks’ monitoring incentives.
Then multiple-bank lending entails lower overall monitoring than individual-bank
3
lending due to free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts, and it is no longer optimal.
Banks value greater diversification because they have limited lending capacities.
In the model lending is restricted by the presence of capital requirements, but other
stories which limit banks’ diversification opportunities are in line with our theory. For
example, restrictions (regulatory as well as economic) to banks’ geographical scope
and sector specialization may impose such limits and justify multiple-bank lending.
The novelty of this paper is to explain why banks may prefer to share lending
even if this implies free-riding and duplication of eﬀorts in their monitoring activities.
Given the need and importance of monitoring, the results of the model are particularly
applicable to the financing of small and medium businesses and, to some extent, to
the formation of loan syndicates.3
This paper is related to a number of others. First, it relates to the literature
on banks’ incentives to monitor. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) rely on the non-
contractibility of monitoring to explain the coexistence of banks and capital markets
in a context where only one bank operates and monitors. Carletti (2004) analyzes how
banks’ incentives to monitor change with the number of bank relationships and how
this aﬀects firms’ optimal borrowing choice. Similarly, Winton (1993) analyzes the
monitoring incentives of multiple shareholders. None of these papers, however, look
at the eﬀects of diversification on banks’ monitoring incentives and advantages from
sharing lending. In this respect, our paper relates to Diamond (1984) and Cerasi and
Daltung (2000). However, whereas they focus on how diversification influences moni-
toring incentives in a single-bank context, we use the incentive eﬀect of diversification
to analyze the optimality of multiple-bank lending.4
The paper shares insights also with the literature on financial structure as a com-
mitment to monitor. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chiesa (2001) and Almazan
(2002) we focus on the importance of inside equity and capital requirements, but we
enrich the framework by introducing multiple monitors and diversification oppor-
tunities. Thakor (1996) analyzes the optimal number of banks firms approach for
credit in a model where banks perform screening and are subject to capital require-
ments. Firms always approach multiple banks, as this reduces the probability of
being rationed. By contrast, we analyze banks’ choice between individual-bank and
multiple-bank lending, in a context where banks perform postlending monitoring and
3Capital requirements, lending limits, banks’ need of greater diversification are indeed the main
reasons for syndicates (Simons, 1993; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000), which may lead, however, to
free-riding (Esty and Megginson, 2003).
4A contrasting view is in Winton (1999), where diversification may worsen a bank’s incentive to
monitor and increase its chance of failure when loans are suﬃciently exposed to sector downturns.
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entering into multiple-bank relationships is not always optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic
model. Section 2 analyzes banks’ choice between individual-bank and multiple-bank
lending. Section 3 discusses the importance of bank leverage and Section 4 the ro-
bustness of the basic model. Section 5 contains the empirical implications. Section 6
concludes.
1 The Basic Model
Consider a two-date economy (T = 0, 1) with three classes of risk neutral agents:
numerous firms, banks and investors. Firms have access to an investment project
each, and need external funds to finance them. Only bank lending is available, and
banks can decide either to finance firms on their own −individual-bank lending− or
to share lending with other banks −multiple-bank lending.
Projects are risky and their returns are i.i.d. across firms. Each project i requires 1
unit of indivisible investment at date 0, and yields a return Xi = {0, R} at date 1.
The success probability of each project i, pi = Pr{Xi = R}, depends on the behavior
of its entrepreneur. It is pH if he behaves well, and pL if he misbehaves, with pH > pL.
Misbehavior renders entrepreneurs a non-transferable private benefit B, which can
be thought of as a quiet life, managerial perks, and diversion of corporate revenues
for private use. There is a moral hazard problem because entrepreneurs’ behavioral
choices are not observable.
Banks have E units of capital each and raise D units of deposits (henceforth, also
debt) from dispersed investors. Firms receive financing only if banks expect non-
negative profits, i.e., if they expect a return at least equal to the gross proceeds y ≥ 1
from an alternative investment. To provide a role for bank monitoring, we assume
that simple lending is not feasible, i.e.,
pH R > y > pLR+B, (A1)
and
∆p(R− y
pH
) < B, (A2)
where ∆p = pH − pL. Assumption (A1) means that projects are creditworthy only
if firms behave well. Assumption (A2) implies that private benefits are suﬃciently
high to induce firms to misbehave even when loan rates are set at the lowest level
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which makes banks break even. Thus, simple lending is not feasible; and, because
firms cannot be given monetary incentives to behave well, we assume for simplicity
that banks extract the full project returns R.5
Suppose now that banks can ameliorate firms’ moral hazard problem through moni-
toring. Each bank j chooses to monitor project i with an intensity mij ∈ [0, 1], which
determines the probability with which it observes firm i’s behavior and improves it in
the case of misbehavior. Monitoring is costly; an intensity mij costs C(mij) =
c
2
m2ij.
The convex cost function reflects the greater diﬃculty for a bank to find out more
and more about a firm; and it means diseconomies of scale in monitoring. The size
of the monitoring costs is determined by the parameter c (henceforth, also referred
to as cost of monitoring).
Banks’ monitoring intensities are not observable either to investors or to other
banks. This introduces another moral hazard problem in the model, and it implies
that banks can raise deposits only if they can credibly promise investors an expected
return at least equal to the proceeds y from the alternative investment.
To create a role for multiple-bank lending, we assume that banks have restricted
lending capacities. One way to think about it is to consider that banks are subject
to a capital constraint ratio 1β (with β > 1), which limits their amounts of lending to
βE. As a consequence, banks raise an amount of deposits equal to
D = (β − 1)E, (A3)
and may not be able to perfectly diversify by themselves.67
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0 banks choose
between individual-bank lending and multiple-bank lending; their choice is observable
to both investors and other banks. Then, each bank oﬀers investors a deposit contract
specifying the per-unit deposit rate. If investors accept the contract, each bank j
chooses the intensity mij with which to monitor project i. At date 1 project returns
are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model if
investors accept the deposit contracts.
5Of course, this rules out also the possibility of direct lending between firms and investors.
6Banks do not have incentives to raise an amount of deposits greater than (β−1)E since investing
in the alternative safe investment gives them zero profits.
7The assumption of limited diversification opportunities creates a potential role for multiple-
bank lending. If it was not satisfied, banks could perfectly diversify by themselves and multiple-
bank lending would never be optimal. See also the discussion about alternative diversification
opportunities in Section 4.
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T=0 T=1
| | | |
banks decide each bank oﬀers each bank projects
whether to be individual a deposit contract chooses its mature;
lenders or enter into to investors monitoring claims
multiple-bank relationships intensity mij are settled
Fig. 1. Timing of the model.
2 Banks’ Equilibrium Choices
The model is solved as follows. We first take banks’ choice between individual-bank
and multiple-bank lending as given, and we characterize the equilibrium of each sce-
nario. Second, we analyze banks’ optimal lending choice.
2.1 Individual-bank Lending
We start by characterizing the equilibrium of the game with individual-bank lending
(henceforth IL). Each bank finances D + E projects and sets the deposit rate at the
lowest level at which investors are willing to deposit their funds. Then, each bank
chooses the monitoring intensity with which to monitor each project. For simplicity,
since banks act independently of each other and we look for symmetric equilibria
where they all behave identically, we focus on a single representative bank.
Let r be the deposit rate and mi be the bank’s monitoring intensity. The success
probability of each project i is equal to
pi = pi(mi) = pH − (1−mi)∆p.
The deposit contract carries a bankruptcy risk, since the bank may not be able to
repay investors the promised deposit rate. The size of such a risk depends crucially on
the monitoring intensities m1...mD+E. The higher mi, the higher the project success
probability, and the more the bank can honor its repayment obligations. In case of
default, depositors split the realized return of the bank portfolio. We can express
the diﬀerence between the deposit rate r and the eﬀective repayment that investors
receive in terms of expected shortfalls as follows.
Definition 1 Let the expected shortfalls of the individual-bank lending game be
S = S(m, r) =
Z D
D+E
r
−∞
(r − D +E
D
z)h(z)dz,
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where m = m1...mD+E is the D+E-dimensional vector of the monitoring intensities
exerted by the bank on each of the D+E projects, and z = 1
D+E
D+EP
i=1
Xi is the average
sample return of a portfolio of D + E projects distributed according to the Normal
density function h(z) with mean R
D+E
D+EP
i=1
pi and variance (
R
D+E
)2
D+EP
i=1
pi(1− pi).8
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is then equal to
r − S; (1)
and the bank’s expected profit is given by
π(m, r) =
D+EX
i=1
piR− yE − [r − S]D −
c
2
D+EX
i=1
m2i , (2)
where the first term is the expected return from the D+E projects the bank finances,
the second term is the opportunity cost of the bank’s capital, the third term is de-
positors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring D +E
projects.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium of the individual-bank lending game.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the individual-bank game, in
which each bank monitors each project with intensity mi = m
IL and oﬀers the deposit
rate rIL, is characterized by the solution to the following equations:
∆pR+
∂SIL
∂mIL
D − cmIL = 0, (3)
rIL − SIL = y, (4)
where SIL = S(mIL, rIL).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The monitoring intensity mIL and the equilibrium deposit rate rIL depend −both
directly and indirectly through the expected shortfalls− on the amounts of deposits
D and inside equity E, the project return R, and the cost of monitoring c.
As already mentioned, raising deposits implies the well-known moral hazard prob-
lem of external financing. Since monitoring is not observable and the deposit rate is
set before monitoring is decided, raising deposits makes the bank lower monitoring
8The Binomial distribution of the variable z is well approximated with a Normal distribution
when (D +E)p(1− p) > 10 (see, e.g., Ross, 1976).
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to reduce costs and avoid sharing the benefit with the investors. This mechanism is
captured by the second term in (3), which is negative as lower monitoring increases
the expected shortfalls. The moral hazard problem impacts the equilibrium deposit
rate (4), which, in turn, worsens the problem.
The severity of the moral hazard problem depends on the amount of inside equity
E, the cost of monitoring c, and the project return R. For a given level of debt,
a high E reduces the moral hazard problem and improves monitoring through the
eﬀect on the expected shortfalls. As it allows the bank to finance more projects
and reach a greater degree of diversification, a high E reduces the variance of the
distribution of the average sample return z. This increases the benefit of monitoring
accruing to the bank, and it reduces the expected shortfalls. A low c (or a high
R) improves the bank’s incentive to monitor and decreases the expected shortfalls.
Thus, the equilibrium monitoring intensity with individual-bank lending mIL grows
with the amount of inside equity and the project return, whereas it falls with the cost
of monitoring. The opposite happens for the equilibrium deposit rate.
2.2 Multiple-bank Lending
We now turn to the equilibrium of the game with multiple-bank lending (henceforth
ML). As before, the equilibrium requires that each bank j sets the deposit rate rj to
satisfy investors’ individual rationality constraint, and that each bank j chooses the
monitoring intensity mij for each project i so as to maximize its expected profit.
The diﬀerence with the individual-bank lending game depends on how banks share
project financing and interact in their monitoring decisions. We assume that each
bank shares financing with other k−1 banks so that it invests 1/k unit in each of the
k(D + E) projects in return for R
k
in case of project success. All banks choose how
much to monitor each project simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The individual
monitoring intensities, however, are interrelated in the impact on the firm’s behavior.
It is enough that one bank discovers misbehavior to induce good entrepreneurial
behavior and increase the success probability of the whole project. The idea is that
monitoring delivers a public good, and all banks financing a firm benefits from the
higher success probability of the project.
The success probability of project i with multiple-bank lending is then equal to
pki = p(Mi(mi1...mik), k) = pH −
Yk
j=1
(1−mij)∆p = pH − (1−Mi)∆p, (5)
whereMi = 1−
Qk
j=1(1−mij) is the total monitoring intensity that the k banks exert
in project i.
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Similarly to before, we can define the expected shortfalls on the deposit contract
as follows.
Definition 2 Let the expected shortfalls of the multiple-bank lending game be
Sk = S(M, r) =
Z D
k(D+E)
rj
−∞
(rj −
k(D +E)
D
v)g(v)dv, (6)
where M = [M1...Mk(D+E)] is the k(D + E)−dimensional vector of the total mon-
itoring intensities that all k banks exert on each of the k(D + E) projects, and
v = 1
k(D+E)
k(D+E)P
i=1
Xi is the average sample return of a portfolio of k(D +E) projects
distributed according to the Normal density function g(v) with mean 1
k(D+E)
R
k
k(D+E)P
i=1
pki
and variance
³
1
k(D+E)
´2 ³
R
k
´2 k(D+E)P
i=1
pki (1− pki ).
Investors’ expected return per unit of deposit is equal to
rj − Sk; (7)
and bank j’s expected profit is given by
πkj (M, r) =
k(D+E)X
i=1
pki
R
k
− yE −
h
rj − Sk
i
D − c
2
k(D+E)X
i=1
m2ij, (8)
where the first term represents the expected return from the k(D+E) projects bank
j finances, the second term is the opportunity cost of capital, the third term is depos-
itors’ expected return, and the fourth term is the total cost of monitoring k(D + E)
projects.
Expressions (5) and (8) show the features of the multiple-bank lending game.
First, for given lending capacity, banks can finance more projects and reach a greater
degree of diversification than with individual-bank lending. Each bank can finance
k(D +E) projects instead of D +E. Second, the success probability of each project
depends on the monitoring of all k banks. This creates a free-riding problem: because
monitoring is privately costly and not observable, each bank has an incentive to
reduce its own eﬀort and benefits from the other banks’ monitoring. Third, there
is a duplication of eﬀorts because banks do not coordinate in the choice of their
monitoring intensities.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the multiple-bank lending game.
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